

14 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Weapons Effectiveness Indicators ☐

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25X1 1. Thanks for your helpful memorandum of 27 February on WEIs. ☐ I am very intrigued by paragraph 3c and a comparison of the two charts of effectiveness trends. As you point out, the differences where they occur are due to different weighting factors and subjective judgments, plus the tendency to underrate one's own weapons and overrate the enemy's. Still, the differences you point out in artillery and the start differences in light tanks and armored fighting vehicles are very impressive. Even the major difference in evaluation of major anti-tank weapons is interesting. ☐

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2. What strikes me is the possibility that we could deduce what the characteristics are of anti-tank weapons, artillery, and light tanks/armored fighting vehicles which give the Soviets cause to believe they have an advantage/disadvantage compared with us. The U.S. military always views the Soviets, in my opinion, in terms of the qualities we would like in our weapon systems. By failing to appreciate why the Soviets put the qualities into their systems that they do, we may also fail to appreciate how they are going to use their weapon systems. I don't want to make a major project out of this, but if any of your pros in this area could give any one of these three examples a little thought to see what we can learn from the fact that the two military organizations view the comparative capabilities so differently, I'd be grateful. Perhaps we can just kick it around after you've thought about it a little bit. ☐

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